Context

In December 2007, the European Council decided to review the implementation of the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003. Further to the Councils decision, the EUISS launched a project addressing European Interests and Strategic Options with a view to foster debate in the EU. The seminar in Warsaw/Natolin, organised in cooperation with the European Centre Natolin, was a part of this exercise focusing specifically on the EU’s neighbourhood. Plenary debates focused on European values and interests, did a stocktaking of the ENP and identified views from the neighbours. Four subsequent working groups addressed the themes of 1) democracy and good governance; 2) unresolved conflicts; 3) energy security and 4) borders.

The conference was addressed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Poland and Romania, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Konstantyn Yeliseyev and was hosted by Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, Chair of International Relations Committee of the European Parliament.
Panel 1: Values and interests in EU policy towards the neighbours

Values and Interests
The panellists agreed that EU foreign policy has to be a mix of both values and interests. It was also argued that a value-driven foreign policy is particularly important in guiding relations with close neighbours not least because the more similar the neighbours are, the more likely it is that our relations with them are consensual. For example, the EU’s relations with the European Economic Area (EEA) states are particularly close whilst our relations with Russia are increasingly problematic.

ENP countries are advised to align themselves with CFSP declarations and most of them do so. The three ENP states that enjoy an advanced status vis-à-vis the EU – Morocco, Israel and Ukraine – are also the closest in terms of their values to the EU. At the same time, the EU continues to stress both values and interests in its dealings with Moscow even though Russia has moved further away from the EU’s set of values in recent years. There is no doubt, however, that the EU needs to work closely with Russia especially in those areas where the EU has considerable interests such as energy, economy and conflicts in the former Soviet republics.

Revision of the Implementation of the ESS/EU PRTs in Afghanistan
It was declared that Poland supports the process of revising the ESS. It was argued that the document produced in 2003 should be re-tuned to reflect better the current environment of the EU and its increased membership. Such a reflection should also be used to reconsider relations between NATO and the EU.

The implementation of the ESS and the capacity of the EU to act externally are crucial tests – an example could be the EU presence in Afghanistan. In this context a proposal was put on the table to create five EU Provisional Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan in order to aid the country’s civilian capacities and to allow those member states whose contributions to ISAF are limited by caveats to engage in other areas. The involvement of European Gendarmerie Force could be considered in this context.

Relations with Eastern Neighbours
For two reasons EU’s Relations with its Eastern Neighbours occupied a considerable share of this panel’s discussion: 1) the conference coincided with the presentation of the Polish-Swedish proposal for an ‘EU Eastern Partnership’; 2) the presence of the Deputy Minister from Ukraine on the panel.

There was some divergence of views regarding general approaches towards ENP countries. Some participants argued that the EU needs to pursue a common and undiversified approach towards the Southern and Eastern members, whilst others argued for a clearer distinction between European Neighbours (East) and the Neighbours of Europe (South). It was argued in this context that the Eastern ENP states may join the EU at some point, whilst the Southerners would not. However, there was a consensus that in the framework of the current ENP all states
should be treated equally. Solidarity amongst the ENP states was also called for by both sides of the argument.

Ukraine clearly sees itself as a frontrunner amongst the ENP states. Ukraine is, however, dissatisfied with the ENP and it wants to move beyond ENP’s ‘narrow format’. Ukraine welcomed the idea of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership, however, not without reservations, especially, concerning the lack of any reference in the proposal to Kiev’s aspiration to join the EU. Still, however, it was argued that Ukraine sees the proposal as an opportunity to draw a clear line between the European neighbours and the Neighbours of Europe and that the proposal moves away from the notion that ENP is an alternative to enlargement.

Relations with Belarus were also a matter for discussion. The EU policy of sanctions was criticized as inconsistent and counter-productive. It was argued that it is inconsistent that the EU lifted its sanctions against Cuba, but keeps them *vis-à-vis* Belarus (although the latter’s regime was deemed as less authoritarian than Cuba’s). It was also argued that sanctions are making Belarus more and more dependent on Russia, hence, weakening its links the West.
Panel 2: Achievements and shortcomings of EU Policy towards the neighbours

The effectiveness of ENP is undermined by two main factors: 1) the unclear end-game of the policy – ENP countries are expected to undertake painful reforms, but in the absence of an EU membership perspective it is unclear what their ultimate reward will be. This is also the case in the South where, whilst ruling out membership, the EU has not sketched out what the future shape of its relations might be; 2) High energy prices and the EU’s dependency on external sources of supply means that there are considerable transfers of funds to the neighbours, regardless of the ENP.

There is the issue of consistency and coherence in the ENP. The EU does not promote democracy to the same extent in the South as it does in the East. For example, Belarus is excluded from the ENP because of its authoritarian regime, whilst Tunisia is an ENP member despite the fact that it is not democratic. In addition, the EU’s credibility as a democracy-promoter has been undermined by its policy vis-à-vis Hamas, which despite being democratically elected, was boycotted by the EU.

In the East: the presence and effectiveness of the EU are also weakened by competition in the region with Russia. This means that the ENP is in fact more political/geopolitical than enlargement was, at least, this is the way it is viewed from Russia. Three recommendations were put forward regarding relations with the Eastern neighbours:

1) The EU should strengthen its role in solving the so-called ‘unresolved conflicts’ in its neighbourhood – for now the EU is active is promoting confidence-building measures but otherwise its role is limited.

2) The idea of a so-called ENP-Light for those neighbours that do not meet ENP-proper criteria – such as Belarus – may be worth considering.

3) Eastern Partnership and especially its visa-facilitation provisions are indeed very important for the ENP states in the East.

In the South: ENP has brought confusion to the EU’s relations with the Southern neighbours, since the EU already had the Barcelona Process (BP) in place since the mid-1990s. BP, as deficient as it may have been, was more inclusive and less diverse. For example Syria and Algeria are not in the ENP but they are in the BP. Morocco has just gained ENP advanced status as has Israel.

ENP is a bilateral policy that doesn’t cover all the relevant issues, because it depends on the will of the partners with the EU driving the process. The implementation of Action Plans has often been lax. The following recommendations were proposed:

1) The emerging Mediterranean Union should focus on visa-facilitation programmes as one of its primary objectives;

2) Civil societies in the partner states should be involved to a greater extent;

3) It is important to keep the geopolitical equilibrium between the East and the South. This should also concern the financial aid directed to these regions.
Report: Working Group on Energy
by Giovanni GREVI, EUISS

The EU’s energy dependence will increase substantially over the coming years, most gas and oil imports will come from geopolitically sensitive regions, notably the Middle East, Russia and Central Asia, as well as Western Africa. At the same time, the energy demands of new economic giants such as China and India are skyrocketing, which will lead to a discrepancy between demand and supply. The may well be aggravated by inadequate investment into exploration, extraction, refining and transportation – a problem that is compounded by the growing share of reserves controlled by national oil companies.

In the face of this critical cycle, participants felt that external energy policy and energy security should feature prominently in the review of the ESS implementation. Energy production was described as a source of economic and political power; it was argued that energy can be a basis for cooperation or a source of tension at the international level. The tension between the market approach, favouring competition and seeking low prices, and the strategic approach, where the state plays a prominent role in energy choices which are guided by political considerations, was stressed. This tension affects both relations between the EU and its partners, such as Russia, and the internal EU debate between partisans of market liberalisation and those favouring national champions.

Some noted that the formulation of a truly common energy policy at the EU level was complicated by the different energy mixes and outlooks of the Member States. Divergent perceptions on nuclear energy as a partial alternative to fossil fuels posed a particular problem. Differences on the nuclear dossier also affected EU energy policies towards the Mediterranean and Middle-East neighbourhoods, with some ambivalence within the EU on the risks that the civilian use of nuclear power could pose for vertical and horizontal proliferation.

The question of the diversification of energy sources and transport routes was also addressed, it was also stated that the pipeline network was inadequate to guarantee the seamless supply of energy both into the Union and within the Union between EU Member States. The apparent lack of legal clarity on the management of existing transport frameworks posed another serious problem.

Policy implications and recommendations

- The achievement of an internal energy market is a key condition for Europe to perform a credible external energy policy and enhance its energy security.
- New pipelines are required to achieve diversification of supplies but also to ensure that there is enough transport capacity. The more pipelines, the better.
- Within the EU, connectors should be established to ensure that all countries are plugged into the distribution network, thereby enhancing internal cohesion.
- A viable and transparent legal framework should be set up to regulate transit pipelines and establish clear mutual commitments for the EU and its neighbours.

- The EU and its Member States need to boost their investment in energy-related R&D and technology with a view to enhancing energy efficiency and develop sustainable alternatives to fossil fuels.

- Improving energy efficiency offers much scope for cooperation with its neighbours. Options for cooperation in the civilian nuclear sector can also be explored, while ensuring a proliferation-proof regime.

**Report: Working Group on Unresolved Conflicts**

by Sabine Fischer, EUISS

The term ‘frozen conflict’ is misleading in the case of the conflicts on the territories of Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan, on which discussion focused. All these conflicts are live and in three out of four cases are in danger of escalation. It was pointed out that the conflicts have a very detrimental impact on the states concerned as well as regionally. They keep alive separatism and undermine sustainable development and democratic consolidation, they also foster remilitarisation across borders.

Throughout the discussion it became evident that it is important to differentiate between the conflicts. Russia is currently trying to negotiate a political settlement in Transnistria. It was pointed out that there is no strong ethno-political component to the conflict in Transnistria; one participant called the Transnistrian attitude ‘economic separatism’. The strongest driver of Russian policy seems to be the creation of a positive precedent of conflict resolution in Europe as opposed to less successful Western efforts in Kosovo. Nagorno-Karabakh is the most internationalised conflict in the region. Here stronger EU engagement is among others limited by the role individual Member States play in the Minsk Process. Therefore, a ‘europeanisation’ of the attitudes of these Member States might be a way to increase the EU’s role in Nagorno-Karabakh. The situation in both conflicts in Georgia is volatile. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia are teetering on the brink of escalation since Kosovo’s independence. It was pointed out that while political structures in South Ossetia are very weak, de facto authorities in Abkhazia are much stronger and better organised and have a clear vision of independence.

It was also pointed out that this conflict (similar to the other unresolved conflicts) has different dimensions: the internal dimension, i.e. relations between Georgia and Abkhazia; the regional dimension, i.e. relations between Georgia and Russia, and a strategic dimension, i.e. the involvement (to different degrees) of external actors like the EU, NATO and other international organisations. The EU is engaged on all three levels: it cooperates with Georgia in the framework of the ENP action plan, which entails measures in the area of conflict resolution. It cooperates with other external actors and coordinates its policies with them. EU policies are probably weakest in the second dimension (Georgian-Russian relations and Russian policy
regarding the conflict) because EU Member States disagree over relations with Russia and consequently over what kind of engagement in the unresolved conflicts is possible. It was emphasised that the unresolved conflicts (and their being linked to EU-Russia relations) have the potential to keep pulling the EU apart unless they are addressed proactively.

In the case of Abkhazia some participants saw a window of opportunity for the EU after Kosovo’s independence. It was pointed out that the steps taken by Russia recently (legalisation of relations with Abkhazia, lifting of economic sanctions, deployment of more Russian troops in Abkhazia), together with the commotion they caused in the region as well as in the international community made the situation more fluid than it has been for years. A multitude of statements by different EU actors as well as HR Javier Solana’s recent visit to Abkhazia was evidence of the strong awareness within the EU of the security threat and the need to pursue a more active policy.

Recommendations

It was emphasised that the EU is already engaged in conflict resolution on various levels. It works on increasing Georgia’s (and the other affected states’) attractiveness for the separatist regions through cooperation in the framework of the ENP Action Plans. It nominated a Special Representative for the South Caucasus, who is actively engaged in conflict resolution measures in both regions. However, in this particular and dangerous situation, the EU should use the momentum and become more proactive.

Regarding the parties to the conflict as well as Russia the EU should give clear signals. It should

1) back Georgia and at the same time deter the Georgian leadership from taking military action;

2) reassure the Abkhaz side that their concerns (regarding Georgia as well as Russia) are being taken seriously by the EU, and empower them so as to become a relevant interlocutors for Georgia;

3) engage with Russia, because there cannot be a solution to the conflict without Russian participation, and at the same time call upon Russia to play a constructive role in conflict resolution.

Some participants were of the opinion that the EU should first and foremost rely on its symbolic strength and focus on confidence building and post-conflict economic reconstruction. It was pointed out that the EU had the potential to open a window to the world for the Abkhaz population. In this context, the deployment of EU information offices in Abkhazia was discussed as a possible measure. It was argued that the EU should in general increase its presence on the ground. A bigger number of police liaison officers in Abkhazia could improve the security situation and complement – not replace – Russian peace keeping troops. Some participants called for a greater role for the EU in peace negotiations. It was emphasised that there is no quick fix for the conflict in Abkhazia or any other conflict in the region. Negotiating solutions will take a long time, not the least because a positive outcome implies changes of attitudes on all sides involved.
To create a ‘ring of friendly states’ and ensure security in its neighbourhood the EU has to decide what type of borders it wants to have with its neighbours. Though this subject is traditionally the domain of Justice and Home Affairs, it is the case that the theme of ‘borders’, and the range of issues it raises, bring into focus the inescapable and rising linkages that exist between the internal and external aspects of EU security.

With these thoughts in mind, the working group discussed a bundle of interrelated issues: migration, free movement of goods, border controls and visa facilitation and considered how far they should be incorporated into EU thinking about security and the European Security Strategy. The central problem that the debate revolved around was: if we open up our borders will we be less secure? A straightforward question but one which defied a straightforward answer.

Discussion began with a consideration of how, through successive enlargements, the EU’s borders have been drawn across ever more challenging regions, with neighbouring states that are ‘less-like’ the EU. In response, the EU has sought to install good governance in the neighbourhood drawing the neighbours closer to the EU by exporting aspects of its model of integration. At the same time, there has been a firming-up of the EU’s external borders both in the East and the South.

Panel speakers reminded the group that borders are not just about challenges and security threats, but that they also present opportunities to create security. Certainly, in regions where border security management is lacking, illegal cross border activities and trafficking fester. But at the same time the same borders can represent opportunities to create complex, transnational regions of administrative and cultural activity and exchange, with the EU playing a central role.

When confronting the question of borders and cognate issues, the EU seems to be caught between a drive for greater regulation, securitisation and thus harder borders on the one hand, and calls for more liberalisation and softer, more porous borders, on the other. For example, the EU and its member states have become better adept at regulating and managing borders, not least via the coordinating functions of FRONTEX. But the EU also puts an emphasis upon the merits of cross-border activities, regional integration and encourages people-to-people contacts with and amongst the neighbours. Crucially, such activities will only prosper with less restrictive borders and enhanced free movement principles. Reflecting on this, participants commented that there appears to be a contradiction, even a tension in the EU’s policies. The challenge the EU and its member states face is how to strike a balance between these two momentums, in a way that ensures a keen sense of security and at the same time does not diminish the EU’s own values.

The subsequent discussion focused on the following issues.

- The EU’s current approach to its borders: The group debated as to whether Schengen remained the best regime for the EU27 and whether the southern and eastern borders can still be managed in the same way? The group cast doubt on the long-term future of...
Schengen, with some participants suggesting a more flexible regime where the EU could soften, but also harden borders in varying ways according to specific contexts.

- **Visa facilitation:** The EU needs to up its game when it comes to visa facilitation, not least because it is a key theme in the recent Eastern Partnership and Mediterranean Union initiatives. As participants noted, progress is being made with the eastern neighbours in this area, but overall the lack of user-friendly visa regimes that allow citizens of neighbouring states to work/study/visit the EU stymies the development of EU-neighbourhood relations.

- **Migration as a security issue and the ESS:** Over recent years migration has become a securitized issue and has subsequently entered into the EU’s threat perception. Participants called for a ‘de-securitization’ of migration and consequently the overall feeling of the group was that migration should not feature in the European Security Strategy. At the same time, participants were keenly aware of the problems associated with the continued separation of JHA and CFSP/ESDP agendas and the resulting weak coordination across these areas on migration/border issues. The goal seems to be to enhance Europe’s security; reduce the loss of life and suffering that goes with illegal immigration and trafficking.

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**Working Group on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the European Neighbourhood**

by Esra BULUT, EUISS

The speakers noted that the European Security Strategy refers to well-governed countries, but not specifically to democracy, human rights or the rule of law. The discussion focused primarily, but not exclusively on the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and why, despite the promotion of democracy and rule of law having been a major goal shaping the ENP from its inception, democritisation in the neighbourhood has been slow, suffering substantial set-backs. The group explored the incentives, objectives, priorities and geographical scope of the ENP and other policies towards the neighbourhood.

**Incentives**

The resources made available through the ENP as incentives for reform in partner countries were deemed insufficient, and as making success in the area of democracy and rule of law promotion improbable. In addition to this resource challenge, further impediments to the EU successfully influencing reform in partner countries were raised. These included the fact that positive conditionality has not been applied consistently, the lack of a framework in which to measure performance, and widespread corruption in many of the target countries. There was little support for isolation, with logical tailor-made engagement advocated as a much better tool for dealing with various actors, including Hamas. There was broad support for more engagement with civil society, encouraging European non-state actors to engage in dialogue with their counterparts in partner countries.
There was broad agreement that the EU needs to improve its attractiveness to both the governments and populations of the partner countries. The provision of more information to partner countries about the EU and its policies, the development of distinct tools for addressing governments and populations, and the tailoring of relevant and comprehensible information about democracy and rule of law for each country were raised as potential means. Visa-waiver schemes were identified as particularly important in engaging with young people in the partner countries. Visa-waiver schemes were also cited as evidence that it was not necessarily the size/cost of incentives that mattered, but the effective application of conditionality vis-à-vis these incentives.

Objectives & Priorities

There was broad agreement that both stability and reform are in the interests of the EU. There was however disagreement on the extent to which the EU faced a dilemma between the two objectives. One participant suggested that a dilemma between reform and stability would not be faced if the EU was more proactive in its interaction with both state and society actors in target countries, and stopped looking at the regimes as monolithic actors, but as comprising an array of individuals and institutions with varying interests. In relation to the Southern neighbourhood, some participants argued that a fear of political Islam had negatively affected European policy, while others countered that it was unclear whether moderate Islamists were really independent of anti-democratic extremists.

There was disagreement over whether the EU should pursue human rights, democracy and rule of law simultaneously, or prioritise rule of law for tactical reasons. Against calls for rule of law to be prioritised by some participants, other participants argued that it was not possible to have rule of law without accountability, and that even a tactical prioritisation of rule of law could weaken prospects for democracy. In any case, it was suggested that the EU should focus on specific areas of reform, clarify its understanding of democracy, and be clearer and consistent in addressing failure to reach objectives agreed in country action plans.

Geographical Scope

The speakers and participants differed on the question of whether there should be further differentiation between Southern and Eastern partners, and between individual countries, in the context of the ENP and other policies. One argument, in favour of further differentiation between countries, was based on a categorisation of countries according to their relative dependency on the EU and the degree to which they pursue reform policies supportive of ENP norms and values. Citing the danger of external pro-reform influence being useless, even counter-productive, advocates of this position argued that the EU should not financially support those countries unwilling to pursue reform and over whom the EU has little influence such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Libya and Syria. Other speakers and participants opposed any further differentiation within the ENP framework, challenging the desirability and feasibility of withdrawing funding from such countries. The fact that the ENP framework was already in place, the exemplary function such funding constitutes, the fact that regime’s stances could not be equated with that of each countries public, and the fact that such arguments might be seen as legitimizing disengagement with these countries on reform questions overall were all cited as
reasons. One participant argued that a better way forward would be to put into practice the positive conditionality already existing on paper. It was also argued that there was already a clear differentiation between Southern and Eastern partner countries, with an element of imposition on the Eastern partner countries and less flexibility when compared with the Southern partner countries.

The group evaluated recent moves to enhance existing, and develop new, multilateral frameworks to govern relations with the neighbourhood, including the Black Sea Synergy, Union for the Mediterranean, and the Eastern partnership. It was argued that these initiatives should be understood in the context of internal manoeuvring between member-states to ensure relatively balanced division of a limited budget. It was argued that the resulting array of mechanisms might be an opportunity for using historical ties to develop special relationships with various countries, as long as this was done with more European coherence, and that such proposals were discussed between member-states before being publicised. The Barcelona process was challenged as too inflexible a multilateral format – with the table too large for some issues, and too small for others, suggesting the need for a more flexible format.

Policy Implications and Recommendations:

- More proactive and tailor-made incentives and communication strategies should be developed vis-à-vis target countries, including the provision of more information about the EU and its policies, the development of distinct tools for addressing governments and populations, and the tailoring of relevant and comprehensible information about democracy and rule of law for each country.

- European non-state actors should be encouraged to engage in dialogue with their counterparts in the neighbourhood, while other forms of dialogue beyond formal mechanisms should be explored by the EU.

- Progress reports should be clear and consistent regarding partner countries’ failure to reach agreed objectives.

- Positive conditionality should be applied in a transparent and consistent manner.
Panel 4: Views from the Neighbours

This panel featured representatives from Belarus, Tunisia and Ukraine

Belarus

The country’s economic dependence on Russia has grown dramatically in recent years. In two to three years Belarus could no longer be economically viable as a sovereign state. Russia opposes the development of closer links between the EU and Belarus and it is in its interest that Belarus stays outside ENP. The US can afford to pursue a policy of uncompromising sanctions vis-à-vis Belarus because the latter is not its neighbour, but, of course, this is not the case for the EU. By maintaining its policy of economic sanctions against Minsk, the EU is effectively pushing Belarus to Russia’s arms. This policy should be rethought.

Recommendation: The EU should consider lifting sanctions and offering ENP membership to Belarus under several political conditions. These should include: the release of all political prisoners, allowing the freedom of the media and holding free elections.

Tunisia

Tunisia is not democratic, just like Belarus, nonetheless, it is an ENP member and the EU pursues no sanctions against it. The reason is a fear of an Islamist party coming to power, hence, a preference for the maintenance of the existing secular regime. This, however, is misplaced. Moderate political Islam can embrace democracy, as the example of Turkey clearly shows. The inclusion of an Islamist party in Morocco’s governing coalition has stabilised the emergence of Islamist tendencies in the population. Tunisia is corrupt, its economy inefficient and its regime has lost the support of the people – reforms are badly needed.

Recommendation: The EU should use the range of its political (ENP) and economic (investment) instruments to promote reforms. A stronger message from the EU is required.

Ukraine

Ukraine has rapidly progressed in applying the acquis and approximating its legislation in response to the Action Plan and other requirements of the Commission. We can now speak about the ‘Europeanisation’ of the Ukrainian domestic polity – the process that was typical of the accession countries in the 1990s. Ukraine’s interest in the ENP depends on the content of the new enhanced agreement, but Kiev is overall dissatisfied with the ENP and it expects a clear enlargement perspective. This clear focus of Kiev and the enduring popularity of the EU in Ukrainian society means that the EU could have more influence on the country than it does.

Recommendation: Ukrainian civil society often argues that the EU is self-limiting itself in the assessment of political and economic reforms in the country. The EU can and should have a more modernising impact on Ukraine by strengthening its conditionality.
Panel 5: ESS and the neighbourhood

It was stressed during this panel that the ESS is not in the process of being rewritten. The December 2007 mandate of the Council concerned exclusively the revision of the implementation of the ESS and this is exactly what this and other seminars in the series are concerned with. The ESS is not an operational guideline but it provides the EU with a set of principles, such as effective multilateralism and the building of a secure neighbourhood, that need to be applied by concrete actions. Since the adoption of the ESS in 2003 the EU has deployed ESDP missions in the neighbourhood and the member states have contributed to an UNFIL in Lebanon. The EU appointed a number of Special Representatives both in the South and the East and has been active in promoting confidence-building measures in the areas of unresolved conflicts, especially in the Caucasus.

It was also argued that the EU must retain a common policy towards the neighbourhood and resist the temptation to differentiate between the East and the South, as has been the case with regards to democracy promotion. As regards the implementation of the principles laid down in the ESS, the most effective tool for securing the neighbourhood is the process of enlargement. This option is still there and it is essential that negotiations with Turkey lead to a successful conclusion. However, the enlargement option is not available for other areas of the neighbourhood and especially not to the Northern African states. This affects the effectiveness of the ENP as a transformational policy and it is important therefore that a clear alternative is offered to these states. The new agreements negotiated by Ukraine, Morocco and Israel are steps in this direction but they fall short of the neighbours expectations. It also does not add to the coherence of the ENP that these new agreements have different names, respectively, ‘enhanced agreement’, ‘advanced status’ and ‘special status’. It was argued in this context that the idea of ‘everything but Institutions’ put down by Romano Prodi, is certainly worth exploring as a possible route, to give a sense of greater inclusion to EU neighbours.